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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

A.

The Government Monopolist

Defenders of federalism, among whom I count myself, have long been
attracted by the analogy to the market. When any individual is on the
opposite side of the market from a large number of independent parties, then
he is not dependent on any single party for any set of goods and services. The
diffuse distribution of power allows everyone to search the market in order to
obtain the lowest price for goods and services of any given quality. In
competitive equilibrium, the price of these goods and services will equal their
marginal cost, and everyone will emerge the happier. All goods that should
be produced in the open market will be produced, and no goods that should
not be produced will be produced. There will be neither unwarranted subsidy
on the one hand, nor foregone opportunities on the other. Who could ask for
more?
The rise of modern transaction cost economics has forced us, as defenders
of markets, to moderate our optimism about the capacity of markets to clear
in such an advantageous fashion. Today no one thinks that these market
forces invariably will first find the perfect equilibrium and then maintain it
over time. Rather, the argument is one of constrained optimism. There are
persistent and powerful incentives that will draw market participants in the
correct direction. It hardly matters that perfection is unobtainable, so long as
the deviations from the ideal are as small as human institutions can make
them. The best is not allowed to become the enemy of the good, and we
embrace markets for the promise that they hold, and do not condemn them
for the occasional disappointment that they yield.
The antithesis of a well-functioning market is of course the monopoly
power of the government. When it comes to certain forms of critical goods
and services, including those most closely related to self-preservation and
defense, we have to turn to government. The story for that dependence is an
old and well-told one, which lies at the root of the English social contract
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theories,' and need not be rehearsed here. The alternative to a state with
monopoly power over the use of force is a constant conflict of wills and clash
of arms in which every person has the power to be a judge in his own cause.
The abuses of a monopoly power are thought to be a small price to pay for the
elimination of the greater difficulties of anarchy and the uncontrolled use of
force.
But with all that said, the price that is involved is quite high; for
monopolists, especially those who can eliminate or suppress rivals by force,
are known to behave in a way that generates huge gains for those who control
the tools of power at the cost of still greater losses to those who are subject to
that power. The social inefficiency results in the excess of losses over gains.
Yet, even if the naked force of government officials is effectively constrained,
these parties still possess a fair measure of monopoly power. These officials
will therefore have every incentive to behave like monopolists in other
markets-by providing too little service at too high a price, the very vice that
antitrust laws attack. The exact source of misbehavior in government is
difficult to predict because power within government is divided among many
persons and is partially checked by constitutional restraint. Small changes in
the initial positions of public officials and private actors, and subtle
differences in the individual strategies of these players, could lead to marked
differences in outcomes. But these uncertainties in the process do nothing to
negate the corrosive effect that government abuse can have on the operation
of a well-functioning society, even if these uncertainties make it difficult to
identify in advance how that abuse will manifest itself. All too often
aggressive individuals and groups engage in relentless efforts to gain
subsidies for themselves, or to impose taxes or regulations upon rivals, and
this bewildering array of economic regulation of all sorts and descriptions
cannot be explained by any optimistic public interest model of regulation. 2
The forces of self-interest are all too often able, by a combination of influence
and power, to commandeer and control the instruments of government. It is
to guard against these risks that constitutions are established.
1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (J.M. Dent & Sons, 1973)(first published 1651); John Locke, A
Second Treatise of Civil Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government, in Thomas I. Cook, ed, Two Treatises of Government 121 (Hafner, 1947).
2. The suspicion of state power and democratic excesses was a familiar theme in the Federalist
Papers.
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the
public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and
legislative interferences in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-industrious and lessinformed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is
but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally
produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some
thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a
general prudence and industry, and give a regular course of the business of society.
Federalist 44 (Madison), in Roy P. Fairfield, ed, The Federalist Papers 126, 128-29 (speaking of the
Article I, § 10 limitations on the power of states, including a prohibition of the impairment of
obligations of contract).
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There are three well-known strategies to counter these possibilities of
government abuse. The first of these is separation of powers, and involves an
effort to break up government power into constituent parts so that no
individual or group gains access to all the monopoly levers. The second
involves the protection of individual rights and liberties through a
constitution and bill of rights that contains, most notably for these purposes,
some form of property protection, although in other contexts protections of
speech, press, and religion, and procedural due process may prove every bit
as important. And the third is federalism, a system in which there are separate
states or provinces that can be set into competition with one another. The
individuals who are subject to state regulation need not be content with a
"voice" in the political process but can protect their interests through the
right of "exit," that is, through the ability to avoid the difficulties of further
association by picking up stock and going elsewhere. 3 The central focus of
this paper is the role of federalism, with its attendant exit right for private
individuals and firms, in checking the monopoly power of state or provincial
government.
B.

Federalism as a Check on State Power

There is some evident irony in viewing federalism as a check on the power
of state governments. The system was not created by conscious design in the
original constitution. Instead, it was an historical outgrowth of the previous
institutional arrangement in which the separate colonies each had power over
their internal affairs subject only to the external review by the English
Parliament and Crown. At the original founding, the states were the
dominant players and the federal government was their creature, conceived as
a government with delegated powers specifically enumerated in Article I of
the Constitution. 4 The major impulse for the original constitutional design
was to protect the states and their citizens against federal domination, that is,
domination by a government so far removed from the people that it was likely
to be insensitive to their liberties and concerns. There was less concern with
the limitation of the powers of the state against its own citizens, and that those
substantive provisions directed toward that end were cast as explicit
substantive limitations on the power of the state. 5 Instead, the major fear of
3. Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States
(Harvard U Press, 1970), the now obligatory citation. For its application to antitrust law, see Frank
H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26J L & Econ 23, 28-50 (1983), and to land
use decisions, see Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Contracts as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 Cal L Rev 837, 901-12 (1983).
4. See US Const, Art I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." (emphasis
added)).
5. See id at § 10. It is the provisions that are contained in this section that were the subject of
Madison's attack on state power contained in Federalist 44, from which the brief passage was quoted
in note 2. Unfortunately, Madison's discussion contains relatively little about the scope of the
contracts clause, even though it does go into some length about the risks associated with allowing the
states to coin their own money.
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state abuse was discrimination that any state might practice against the
citizens of other states-a theme that is as important today as it was at the
6
founding.
The insight that federalism offered the prospects of structural limitations
against the abuse of state power against its own citizens was not, as far as I can
determine, part of the original constitution plan, but instead ranks only as a
necessary and happy byproduct of that design. It is not possible therefore to
find any early commentary that elaborates on the importance of federalism as
a limitation on state power, so the arguments on the importance of federalism
must be regarded as a modern reinterpretation of a fundamental
constitutional structure in light of what we know to be the risks of government
misconduct. Nonetheless, this element of competition between distinct states
is an inseparable part of any federal system. It is important therefore to assess
the role of federalism in preserving and organizing individual rights.
My conclusion is that while exit rights under federalism offer an important,
indeed indispensable, safeguard against government abuse, the institution of
federalism, without the rigorous enforcement of substantive individual rights,
will not be equal to the formidable task before it. The great virtue of
federalism is that it introduces an important measure of competition between
governments. Federalism works best where it is possible to vote with your
feet. The state that exploits its productive individuals runs the risk that they
will take their business elsewhere. The exit threat therefore enforces the
competitive regime. The weakness of federalism, standing alone, is that, in
certain circumstances the presence of separate states within a federal union
may not foster a competitive situation.
C.

Three Structural Weaknesses of Federalism

There are three types of situations in which federalism provides
insufficient protection for market institutions. First, certain assets are tied to
particular locations for which jurisdictional competition and the exit threat
are not sufficient to discipline state governments. Second, there are certain
transactions in which an individual or firm cannot choose among states, but
must enlist the cooperation of all states in order to carry on its business.
Third, states may adopt counterstrategies, most notably exit taxes of various
kinds, that can neutralize the exit threat that federalism normally affords to
private individuals. These three risks are not trivial, for they cover a large
percentage of the situations that arise within a federalist system.
In looking at these three structural problems, it is important to note that
each has its precise analogue in the analysis of ordinary markets for goods and
services. These private markets tend to work well until the monopoly element
is injected. This monopoly problem can arise in either of two ways: first,
when one party commits specific capital to a venture, as with investments that
6. See id at Art IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). The diversity jurisdiction of Article III, § 2 was also
designed to counter local prejudice.
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are nonsalvageable at the conclusion of the venture by either abandonment,
liquidation, or sale; or, second, when the coordination of multiple parties is
necessary for any given project to be successful, as with a real estate developer
that has to assemble many separate parcels of land in order to build. In both
cases, the right to refuse to do business (the entrepreneur's analogue to the
exit right) has certain major advantages in that it protects parties from
outright confiscation of their assets by potential trading partners. The
existence of the refusal to deal, therefore, will certainly influence the
bargaining strategies of the private parties, and through it the level of goods
and services that are produced and the prices at which they trade. In
bankruptcy, for example, the ability of a trustee to gain an automatic stay
against secured creditors who would otherwise liquidate their claims has
enormous influence both on the shape of reorganization proceedings and the
percentage of satisfaction of creditors' claims. 7 Even the best bankruptcy
rules will yield inferior outcomes in at least some cases, for it may well be that
if the secured creditor with exit rights can remove and sell the secured
property, the going concern value of the business will be lost unless the
trustee and creditor can agree to a reconfiguration of rights after costly
renegotiations. The same difficulty applies with individual exit rights within
federalism, for there are cases in which their exercise could create dislocations
as well.8 But these points are not decisive against federalism. Whatever its
failings, federalism is an institution that improves the odds of forestalling
government misconduct, even thought it cannot eliminate the entire risk of its
occurrence.
In order to see both the strengths and limits of exit rights, the plan of
action is as follows. The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts.
Part II discusses two situations-the market for corporate control and the
problem of environmental harm-in which exit rights are of value in
constraining government power. The proposals to limit exit rights, or to
encourage national solutions, to counteract "destructive" competition are
generally misplaced. With that point first established, I turn next to some
limitations on exit rights. Part III deals with the first of the limitations, the
case in which exit rights are unable to protect specific investments within a
given state. Part IV then deals with the coordination problem, where the
ability to engage in business depends on the ability to do business in all states
simultaneously. Finally, Part V considers state-imposed limitations on exit
rights, a back-handed compliment for the indispensable place that exit rights
have in any system of law.

7. For bankruptcy, see Douglas
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J
8. See Lucian Avre Bebchuk,
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv
file with author).

G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Legal Studies 311, 312-13, 321-24 (1991).
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
L Rev (forthcoming 1992)(sections III and IV of the draft on

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. I

II
SOME USES OF

A.

ExIT

RIGHTS

State Incorporation Law

The question of competition between states arises in those areas in which
states retain the primary power of regulation. One such area is the state
power of incorporation, which is a source of extensive competition between
the states. At present, major firms that do business in many states may pick a
single state of incorporation. Incorporation is generally regarded as a good
for the state of incorporation for the tax revenues it generates and the general
business it provides. The battle between different states often centers on the
inducements each could offer to promoters of new businesses to incorporate
within their jurisdiction. Firms that do not like incorporation in one state can
leave and reincorporate somewhere else. In some circles, this competition
between states has been deplored as a "race to the bottom," on the ground
that the managers will seek out that jurisdiction that is most favorable to their
interests and, by implication, most adverse to the interests of prospective
shareholders. 9 On balance, however, incorporation is an area in which the
exit right operates as a powerful instrument for the public welfare.
The "race to the bottom" claim is flawed because it misses the central
point that the protection individual investors receive under a system of
federalism is derived from their ability to withhold their consent. If the state
incorporation laws allow the officers and directors of a corporation effectively
to expropriate the wealth of shareholders, then, in the first instance, the
original promoters of the new venture will have to bear the costs of those
inferior rules. The rules are a matter of public knowledge, and if they are
skewed in the way in which proponents of the race to the bottom believe, then
initial investors (including institutional investors with great sophistication)
will demand at incorporation more favorable terms to compensate themselves
for the additional legal risks they are asked to assume. As that additional
compensation will cost the promoters of the new venture more than
compliance to a superior set of rules, the promoters will modify by contract any
rules that facilitate the exploitation of shareholders. I am skeptical that there
should be any mandatory terms within corporate charters, but if such are
required, then competition between states within a federal system should spur
states to identify those restrictions that are required and to reject those that
are superfluous.' 0 The empirical evidence seems to be in accord with this
9. See, for example, id. For earlier contributions to the literature, see Ralph Nader, Mark
Green &Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (W.W. Norton & Co., 1976); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L J 663 (1974) (arguing for federal
chartering of corporations). The opposition to their position is developed in Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
Government and the Corporation (Am Enterprise Inst for Pub Policy Research, 1978); Daniel R. Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom"-Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware Corporation Law, 76 Nw U
L Rev 913 (1982).
10. For an extensive debate over these provisions, see Symposium, Lucian Avre Bebchuk, et al,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1395 (1989).
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optimistic view, for those businesses that announce an intention to shift their
state of incorporation to Delaware see significant advances in the value of
their shares. ' In this situation, therefore, the exit right offers incentives for
states to find the right mix between contractual freedom and state regulation.
Professor Bebchuk in his recent contribution on this issue notes that a shift
in the place of doing corporate business could lead to risks to minority
shareholders or to various creditors, both by tort and by contract.' 2 As
regards dissident shareholders, the risk is surely there when majority vote and
not unanimous consent is all that is necessary for reincorporation to take
place. An additional requirement that no identifiable class of shareholders be
left worse off after the reincorporation-a just compensation requirement for
minority shareholders-could go a long way to prevent the abuses that might
otherwise be allowable under majority voting. As regarding creditors, it is
likely to be only the rare situation in which the reincorporation will benefit
shareholders as a group, but at the same time will subject outside creditors
(who otherwise benefit from the increased asset cushion) to greater risks than
they sustained previously. If most shareholders are risk averse, it is unlikely
they will support, even by a simple majority vote, any reincorporation in
another state that increases the volatility of their holdings, the scenario most
likely to prejudice any creditors. Since any federal law is so unlikely to
represent a sensible response to any question of corporate governance, it
seems best to rely on competition across states, notwithstanding the
occasional case in which it might work more harm than good.
B.

Environmental Regulations

The situation with respect to environmental regulation is more
complicated, as there are elements of external harms that cannot be counted
by ordinary markets, even in the absence of federalism. Thus, if state A
induces a firm to locate within its borders by allowing it to pollute the air and
water of state B, then the legal system has surely malfunctioned. But it is a
mistake to insist that federalism solve a set of problems for which competition
itself is not the answer. In the environmental context, the federalism option is
no better than a rule that allows two private parties by agreement to inflict
pollution losses upon a third party. A system of competition presupposes that
goods and services are sold to third parties. It does not suppose that these
third parties will be beaten or deceived. The problem of environmental
spillovers across states is therefore one that the exit right cannot address, but
for which alternative solutions are required. One possible solution under
these circumstances is to allow the state in which the pollution has been
discharged to maintain suit on behalf of its own citizens, either against the
polluting firms or the states that have authorized the pollution in question.
I1. Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition"
versus Federal Regulation, 53J Bus 259 (1980). Note that those commentators who believe in the race
to the bottom generally favor federal regulation.
12. Bebchuk, 105 Harv L Rev (cited in note 8)(section IV B2 of the draft on file with author)
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Still another solution is federal regulation of interstate pollution, as is now
done under the Clean Water Act.' 3 The relative desirability of these two
systems of social control is far beyond the scope of this paper. For these
purposes, where the regulation of private conduct is justified under
traditional tort principles, then the exit option-if relevant at all-should not
be allowed to permit a firm to escape the consequences of its actions.
Even here, a word of caution is necessary, for the exit right assumes a far
more attractive profile when one state seeks to attract new businesses, or to
retain old ones, by excusing them from paying for purely local environmental
damage. Under these circumstances, individual victims of environmental
pollution may well be entitled to redress for the harm they have suffered,
perhaps even as a matter of individual constitutional right, but rival firms in
other states should not be entitled to intervene if the state does not exceed its
constitutional powers relative to its own citizens. If local citizens are
prepared, for example, to tolerate higher levels of pollution in exchange for
their ability to manufacture goods at lower prices, then disappointed out-ofstate competitors should not be allowed to undo that decision in order to
improve their relative competitive position. The danger of too much
environmental regulation (as with excessive cleanups) 1 4 is often as severe as
the risk of too little regulation. The increased competition is of course galling
to the aggrieved competitor, but federal regulation dealing with purely local
pollution (for example, strip mining) is no more justified than is federal
regulation preventing one state from adopting right-to-work laws on the
ground that this form of state labor regulation provides local firms with a
competitive advantage in the open market. Where all environmental losses
are concentrated within the state, the exit option again has important virtues,
for it permits firms to migrate away from states that have embarked on
excessive programs of regulation. Subject therefore to the vital constraint of
harms external to the state, the exit option does impose some valuable
constraint on what local and state governments can do.
III
SPECIFIC ASSETS WITHIN INDIVIDUAL STATES

In principle, then, there is no reason why one should be suspicious of the
exit right in its own terms. While the right might not be sufficient to protect
against all the various forms of state misconduct, it is surely an aid toward that
direction. As the previous section pointed out some of the familiar strengths
of the exit remedy, the next three sections point out some of its limitations.

13. Clean Water Act, Pub L No 92-500 (1972), codified at 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1990),
14. Keith Schneider, U.S. BackingAway from Saying Dioxin is a Deadly Peril, NY Times A I col 6 (Aug
15, 1991).
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Exit Rights of Developers and Landowners

The first weakness of the exit right under the federalist system concerns
cases with specific assets tied to a single jurisdiction. Consider the situation in
which a plot of land is subject to comprehensive regulation by a zoning
authority which has the power to decide whether certain land development
projects should be allowed to go forward. The question arises what social
losses, if any, can be caused by the zoning authority (which for these purposes
we can assume will operate at a state-wide level) if it exercises its general
power in an unwise fashion. In dealing with this question, it is often
customary to examine the situation from the point of view of a developer and
to conclude that the power of the zoning board is sharply limited because of
local competition. 15 If there were many different towns in which the
development could take place, then the developer, who was faced with a set of
powerful restrictions in the one town, could pack his bags and sell the project
to some other location that desires the services in question. Where the power
of regulation is vested in local governments, the distances that have to be
moved are quite small so that the range of alternatives available to any single
developer could be quite extensive. When the relevant unit of government is
a state, the costs of exit are higher, but the exit threat can still be quite
powerful. For example, it is generally recognized that state taxes are less
progressive than national taxes because of the exit option, and several states
have repealed their estate tax in order to stem the flow of retirees out of the
jurisdiction. 16

Yet it is also necessary to stress the limitations of the exit threat. To return
to the real estate example again, it may well be that the developer has options
to take the project elsewhere (a point to which I will come back to), but it
surely does not follow that the landowner who wishes to sell to the developer
has the same level of mobility or the same level of choices. 17 Thus a decision
by the local board to limit development to fancy houses on ten acre plots may
cause only limited consternation to a developer, but the regulation can reduce

15. See, for example, Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Pol Econ 416
(1956). Tiebout's argument was that so long as local governments had to compete for taxpayers,
each would seek to find a niche that will allow consumers to locate the right mix of services and taxes.
Some local governments could specialize in quality education, and others in facilities for retirees, so
that individuals could gravitate to where they were most welcome. Thus, governments could be
made to act at least a little like a market.
16. Prohibition of Gift and Death Taxes, 1982 Cal Stat ch 1535, § 13,301, codified at Cal Rev
and Tax Code § 13,301 (West 1970 & Supp 1991).
17. The fundamental difference in the position of the two parties is not taken into account in
Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 91 Colum L Rev 473, 500-04 (1991), discussing Nollan v California CoastalCommission, 483 US
825 (1987), criticizing my views on the case and commenting on Richard A. Epstein, Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988). Professor
Been notes that the exit right will protect developers in land use contexts. Been, 91 Colum L Rev at
511 (cited in this note). However, Nollan involved a homeowner without an exit right, and, in any
event, Professor Been overstates the value of the exit remedy.
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market value of the land by perhaps eighty or ninety percent.' 8 But the
landowner is tied to the location, and so long as the political forces are
aligned against him-nothing can stop the losses. Nothing, that is, unless
there is some explicit takings protection against zoning-protections which,
while available in principle, are not extensive against most forms of regulatory
takings.19 These losses suffered by landowners are social losses, and by any
measure the situation is an unfortunate one if the losses are greater than the
gains that are obtained by the neighboring landowners who have imposed the
regulation in the first place, which will typically be the case with large lot
zoning and similar restrictions. The point here is not that all zoning
restrictions should be regarded as improper as a matter of course; it is easy to
think of certain restrictions on the location of signs, or for the payment of
sewers and off-site improvements, for example, that are fully justified even
under a system with a strong protection against takings.2 0 The negotiations
between regulators and developers over these issues is often vexed, and some
of the risk of expropriation, while reduced, still remains, for once matters
have gone this far, the exit right is a threat that will prove of value only in rare
situations.
It is important to stress, however, that the losses to the local landowners
are not the only losses that will in fact take place. The developer in this
instance has the right of exit and therefore is not trapped. But it should not
be assumed that an exit right is every bit as good as an entrance right into a
certain community. Quite the opposite. Exit serves only to mitigate the
damages that are sustained by regulation. Yet to say that damages are
mitigated is not to say that they have not occurred at all; nor is it to say that
the damages that remain after mitigation are small. It may well be that the
best counterstrategy available to a victim still leaves him bearing a very large
loss. Presumably, the developer in question had some reason to prefer a site
located in town A instead of town B. There may have been experience in
dealing with local boards, or the developer may have established good
connections with local contractors or suppliers, or have assembled marketing
studies that allowed him to tailor a project to this locale. All of these local
advantages are quickly lost if the landowner is blocked in his effort to make
the deal with the outsider. The developer's opportunity cost of having to
make do with the second best alternative, or perhaps third best alternative, is
not trivial, given that the total cost involved in the project is usually a multiple
of the value of the unimproved land. The usual model of competition
18. See, for example, the regulations sustained in HFH, Ltd. v Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
15 Cal3d 508, 125 Cal Rptr 365, 542 P2d 237 (1975), where the value of the land with a commercial
designation was $400,000, but with a single family residential designation, it was only $75,000.
19. See Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 (1926), a case that set the stage for extensive
regulation of land use in the United States, which has not been altered since that time. Euclid allows
for virtually any form of "reasonable" land use regulation so long as it leaves the owner with some
profitable use of the land. Today, the Supreme Court asks the wrong question: how much is left
after regulation, rather than how much was taken by regulation?
20. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 266-67
(Harvard U Press, 1985).
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assumes that there are many suppliers of fungible goods in the market. But
let the uniqueness of land be taken into account, and even partial fungibility
cannot be assured. The developer who has invested in soil tests or marketing
studies has a site-specific investment in a particular prospect even if he has no
ownership claim to that land at all. He should be required to bear the risks
that the owner will not sell the property, but he can protect himself against
some portion of that risk through option contracts with the landowner. Let
the zoning ordinances change the minimum lot size, however, and the exit
option does nothing at all to protect the developer's site-specific investments.
Nor do the losses stop there, as there are potential customers of the
potential developer who also might prefer this location to any other that is
made available to them. Again being able to leave is not the same as being
able to stay. The right to back out of a contract when the other side breaches
should not be deprecated, but it offers far less protection than a remedy for
expectation damages when the other side is in breach. To say that the exit
remedy is sufficient is to say that walking away from a winning contract
provides the promisee with the ideal remedy. In the contract context, some
damage remedy is required to prevent misconduct by the parties, even if the
damages are difficult to value and calculate. 2 1 The same principle holds in the
case of local regulation. The parallel between just compensation for the
economic loss occasioned by the restriction on use, and expectation damages
for the breach of contract is too close to be ignored. Both are one-time lump
sum damages that are designed to leave the party paid indifferent between the
continuation and termination of his particular project. The elimination of the
contract remedy will lead to excessive breach; the elimination of the just
compensation remedy will lead to excessive condemnation and regulation.
Carrying over these remedial ideals to the regulatory context is not easy.
The just compensation principle should protect the expectations of both
parties to the extent the expectations are realizable by the parties' combined
actions. Yet it is difficult to quantify the losses, especially any that are borne
by the developer. The precise details of these calculations, however, are not
of concern here. What is evident is that the exit right does nothing to protect
the losses of either landowner or developer. And where local governments
can make their political decisions without internalizing the costs thereby
imposed on the regulated parties, they will enact regulations desirable from
the point of view of their electorate, but not necessarily from the point of view
of the larger society.

21. For two studies of contract damage remedies under conditions of uncertainty, see Richard
Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J Legal Studies 365 (1989); Steven
Shavell, Damage Measuresfor Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J Econ 466 (1982). Shavell's work accepts as
axiomatic the utility of damage measurements, but his first footnote lists several prior works on the
economic role of damage measures.
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Public Utilities

Thus far I have stressed the problem of specific rents 22 in connection with
zoning, which is normally a local and not a state function. But the argument
can be easily extended to other forms of regulation that are normally done at
the state level. Regulation of utility rates and insurance markets are two
obvious examples of such regulation, and each of them poses the same
difficulty. Suppose that a power company invests heavily in order to develop a
power plant to supply electricity or heat to a community, and that its rates and
activities are subject to regulation by a Public Utility Commission ("PUC").
Here the PUC is normally given continuous power to regulate the activities of
the utility, so that there is no once and for all contract that exists at the time
the regulator starts its activities. Indeed there is early authority to the effect
that the state could not contract away its police power (including the power of
rate regulation) even if it tried to do so. 2 3 Once the utility has committed its
resources to the region, however, then there is the same risk of opportunistic
behavior 2 4 by government that is available to private parties whose trading
partners have made initial investments. Unless there is specific protection
against exploitation, the trading partner will try to expropriate quasi-rents
from the party whose investment is complete, and will pay a price that is just
large enough to keep that party in place (that is, to cover variable costs with a
little something left over) without providing compensation for the initial
front-end investment. Again the parallel between the contract situation and
the eminent domain situation seems clear, and while there is much
disagreement over the proper formula that should be used to determine the
minimum rate of return made available to a public utility, everyone agrees
that some compensation is required. 25 The necessary implication is clear.
The governments are part of the federal system, but the exit remedy is
manifestly insufficient. Some explicit takings protection is required as well.
The problem here is one of sufficient universality that it cannot be treated as a
peculiarly American issue; it is equally applicable to Canada or any other
modern industrial democracy. Just as competitive conditions do not hold
when two firms have made contract-specific investments on the strength of a
special relationship, so too the exit remedy loses much of its punch when a
firm has invested heavily in specific resources within a given region.

22. For a concise definition of "rents" in the economic context, see John Eatwell, Murray
Milgate & Peter Newman, eds, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 141 (Stockton Press, 1987).
23. See Stone v Mississippi, 101 US 814 (1879); see also dicta in Boyd v Alabama, 94 US 645, 650
(1876).
24. See, for example, Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn L
Rev 521 (1981).
25. Duquesne Light Co v Barasch, 488 US 299, 310-12 (1989). The Court upheld Pennsylvania's
retroactive disallowance of the recovery of $43 million in "reasonable and prudent" costs for a
cancelled nuclear power plant. The Court noted that even with this recovery disallowed, the utility
company was allowed a fair and reasonable return on its overall investment, which is all that the
formula in Federal Power Comm. v Hope Natural Gas, 320 US 591, 602 (1944), requires.
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IV
COORDINATION PROBLEMS ACROSS JURISDICTIONS

A.

The Land Assembly Problem

The use of market analogies also offers insight into a second limitation of
the exit remedy. Recall that in ordinary markets the best results are obtained
only when an individual purchaser is in a position to choose a contract with
any one of a number of separate suppliers. There are certain situations,
however, when it is necessary to have the cooperation of all the people on the
opposite side of a transaction for it to go forward. In private markets, one
common illustration of the problem is the land assembly question. A business
wants to develop a unique site that is currently owned by a number of
different individuals, but can only do so if all the plots are acquired. The
value of the real estate in its unassembled form, when held by ten
independent landowners, may be worth $100 per plot, or $1,000 altogether.
But if all the plots can be brought under unified ownership, then for this
particular project, the land has a value of $5,000. Faced with this situation,
the developer will take extraordinary precautions to keep hidden the nature of
the ultimate project in order to keep the landowners ignorant of the value of
the project to the developer. 26 But if one of the landowners should find out,
he could exact a price of up to $4,100 for his plot of land without making the
project unprofitable for the developer. 27 If two or more landowners find out,
then there could be elaborate strategic jockeying, with each seeking to hold
out for the largest sum for his own parcel, knowing that other landowners
have the same intentions. The combined demands of the present owners
could easily exceed the $4,000 in assembly value that the project promises,
and if no one is prepared to mitigate demands, a profitable deal could be lost
to everyone's detriment.
In these circumstances, one possible use of the eminent domain power is
to allow the developer to acquire all the plots by a forced purchase at a price
equal to, or even in excess of, market value. Without the forced purchase,
strategic behavior by individual landowners could doom the project. With the
forced purchase at the right price, the deal can go forward, and all parties can
share the gains. The Mill Act disputes in the nineteenth century showed how
important these issues have been in the development of the law of eminent
domain. 28 These statutes resolved the problem by allowing a landowner,
typically with local approval, to flood the land of his neighbors upon payment
of compensation for the land lost, often with some bonus value added. These
Mill Acts, if operable at acceptable administrative costs, can work when
ordinary market solutions are apt to fail because unanimous consent is
26. For the general rule that there is no duty to disclose, see Guaranty Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v
Liebold, 207 Pa 399, 404-05, 56 A 951, 953 (1904).
27. See, for discussion, Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J Legal Studies 351 (1991).
28. See generally Head v Amoskeag Mfg Co., 113 US 9 (1885). I have discussed the Mill Act cases
in some detail in Epstein, Takings at 170-76 (cited in note 20).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. I

necessary for a deal to go through. The ultimate irony is that the existence of
a large and diffuse number of persons on the other side of the market is a sign
of health when a large number of distinct, two-party contracts can yield
substantial social gains. But the multiplicity of persons on one side of the
market is a sign, and source, of genuine bargaining obstacles when the
concurrence of all parties is necessary for a beneficial deal to go forward.
The problems of coordination and holdout can arise with great frequency
within the federalism context. The most important nineteenth century
illustration of the issue concerns the building and pricing on the
transcontinental railroads, both in Canada and the United States. In order to
build the long lines, it is necessary to acquire rights of way in many
jurisdictions. Additionally, once the projects are built, there is a risk of
regulation along each sector by a state or provincial government that will be
able to expropriate the wealth of the railroad developer, who, in this situation,
stands in an analogous position to the party who wants to assemble land for a
new project. If any single state can impose restrictions on the part of the
business that is located within its jurisdiction, then each state can seek to
squeeze out the profits that are associated with the overall venture. Where
there is no coordination among competing states, their inconsistent demands
could easily exceed the net present value of the project, a form of total
confiscation. Knowing that this possibility may await them, some
entrepreneurs will avoid making the kinds of investments that will expose
them to this sort of risk, or, if they do go forward, they alter their pattern of
investment to minimize exposure.
B.

Multistate Coordination Problems

The same sort of issue can arise in other more modern contexts as well.
Many large firms are able to service their clients only if they are entitled to do
business in all states or provinces. The decision by any state to exclude them
will make it impossible to handle national clients. The insurance industry, for
example, is often called upon to write insurance for risks that could occur
anywhere in the country-workers' compensation for a major insured is one
example. If the insurer cannot do business in a single state, then it cannot
follow and adequately service its national risks. A policy that allowed any
individual state to regulate or tax in a fashion that garnered all the profits
from this line of business opens up the coordination and holdout problems of
the land assembly case with a vengeance. It is quite possible that the sum
total of the demands will exceed the gains from running the business, so that
the competition of federalism becomes the destroyer and not the protector of
markets.
Against this evident form of peril, it should be clear that the exit remedy is
of no assistance whatsoever. Leaving the jurisdiction will not allow a bank, a
broker, or an insurance company to service all the risks of its clients. Needing
the cooperation of every state or every province, the firm cannot do its job
simply by leaving those states that accord it a frosty welcome. The firm has to
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be able to force its way into states. At this point, the same type of solutions
that are thought of for the assembly problem have to be considered. The
state may be thought of as a common carrier with a monopoly position, which
is therefore obligated to take all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis if they
can meet certain minimum standards of conduct. Translated into practical
terms, it means that a corporation licensed to do business in one jurisdiction
should be able to receive, as of right, a license to do business in another
jurisdiction so long as it renders itself amenable to service within the
jurisdiction and satisfies the capital requirements that are imposed upon local
firms. 29 The basic principle is no longer one that allows states to turn down

parties at will. Instead, like the obligations of a common carrier, a powerful
nondiscrimination principle governs the entire field. The state is under a duty
to treat the outsider on the same terms and conditions as its local firms.
This principle of nondiscrimination is applicable not only to the entry
problem, but also to the question of state or provincial taxation of multi-state
firms.3 0

If everyone thought that the exit remedy were sufficient for the

occasion, then there would be no need to develop an elaborate set of rules
that limit the way in which states may tax these far flung enterprises. The
articulation of the extensive doctrine that has grown up in the opposite
direction shows that exit is not enough. Thus, think of the business that has
costs of $100 in each of ten jurisdictions and profits of $10,000 that can be
made only if business is carried on simultaneously in all these states. To hold
that discriminatory taxes are permissible is to allow each state to impose taxes
up to $9,000, which could well doom a profitable enterprise. Again the theory
of government failure tracks the theory of market failure. The individual firm
has to be able to force itself into the jurisdiction on even terms with its local
competitors so that its going concern profit is not dissipated by the conduct of
rival states. Here, too, the exit remedy is not enough.
V
STATE-IMPOSED LIMITS ON EXIT RIGHTS

The burden of the previous two sections has been to show that exit rights
are insufficient to protect property rights over a broad range of circumstances.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that these exit rights are of no importance in
governing the relationships between the citizen and the state. The critical
point is that exit rights do have an important role to play in a world in which
the direct protection of property rights is, as it always, will be, insufficient.
The availability of exit limits the degree of exploitation that is possible by the
29. For early cases that applied this principle, see Western Union Telegraph Co. v Kansas, 216 US I
(1910); Southern Railway v Greene, 216 US 400 (1910). There are exceptions to the nondiscrimination
rule, see, for example, I'estern & Southern Life Insurance Co. v Board of Equalization, 451 US 648, 652-55
(1981) (Congress waived commerce clause protection for insurance company). I have analyzed the
doctrine in Epstein, 102 Harv L Rev at 31-40 (cited in note 17).
30. See, for example, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274 (1977); for an exhaustive
analysis, see Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41 Tax Lawyer 37 (1987).
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state. But all too often when exploitation is attempted through regulation,
the power of the exit remedy is revealed by indirection, in the willingness of
the state to limit it by taxation or regulation.
The problem may be illustrated by the following example, drawn from the
situation as it exists in the automobile insurance industry both in New Jersey
and Massachusetts. 3 1 In stylized form, the state has a system of rate
regulation that promises a rate of return that the regulated industry regards as
insufficient. The regulated firms challenge those state regulations in court
and lose on some substantive or procedural ground. A company then decides
to leave the jurisdiction and is willing to abandon specific capital located
within the state and to lose the benefit of all business that requires it to be
within the state. The state, however, does not wish to see the firm go, for if
the insurer leaves two things will happen: a large portion of the state's market
will not be serviced and the absent firm will be unable to make contributions
that are necessary to prop up an assigned risk pool of drivers who cannot
obtain insurance in the voluntary market. Given the existing level of
regulation, it is highly unlikely that any new insurance firm will decide to do
business within the state. So it is a question of how the insurer can be kept
doing business within the state against its will.
A.

Effect of Exit Taxes

It is here that the exit tax becomes critical. Suppose that without the exit
tax the decision to leave the state will cost the firm $1,000. The firm will then
decide to stay in the state so long as the present value of the confiscation it
will suffer in future years under regulation is in the aggregate kept below
$999. The exit right thus limits the amount of loss that will be suffered, even
if it will not prevent the abuse from occurring. But now suppose that a $500
exit tax is imposed, which is an amount that the state says it will need to fund
the firm's share of the assigned risk pool over some future period. If the tax
itself is valid, then it may never be collected directly, because the firm will
decide to stay if the present value of its future losses under regulation are
anticipated to be lower than $1,499. If the firm leaves, with the tax being
valid, the state will be the better by $500, even though the state can hardly
claim to be providing services or benefits to the firm that has decided to leave
the jurisdiction. Either way, therefore, if the tax is effective, it operates as a
partial nullification of the exit right and as an increase in the scope of
confiscation that is possible under the regulatory scheme.
31. See New Jersey Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990, NJ Stat Ann §§ 17:33 B-I et
seq (West 1985 & Supp 1991); Mass Ann Laws, ch 175, § 22H (Michie/Law Coop 1987). The
Commonwealth Automobile Reinsurers ("CAR") Rule II B.3, propagated under the authority of
§ 22H of chapter 175, provides that any insurer that wishes to abandon its license to sell automobile
insurance and retain its other state licenses must make payments into the assigned risk pool for eight
years after it withdraws from that market. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v Gailey, 753 F Supp 46 (D
Mass 1990), refusing to dismiss Aetna's challenge to Rule 11 B.3 on ripeness grounds. I have been
involved in the litigation in New Jersey as a consultant to Allstate Insurance Company.
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In making this point, it should be noted that the exit tax -could take many
forms. In addition to a simple cash levy that is based upon some volume of
past business, it is also possible to impose obligations in kind. For example,
the firm's departure could be delayed until the firm was able to secure some
other firm to cover its business for some period of future years. 32 During the
period of transition, the insurer might be required to write coverage at the old
regulated rates or the firm could be expected to pay a successor corporation
some sum of money in order to pick up that which is otherwise a losing book
of business. 33 But these details are not relevant to the central theme: if the
exit tax is allowed to compromise the exit right, then the prospect of
exploitation against which federalism guards is thereby increased.
The solution seems clear enough. There ought to be a categorical rule
against these exit taxes, so that the firms that do choose to leave can do so
without the fear of facing extensive litigation and penalties for exercising their
choices. Ever since Ex parte Young, 3 4 if not before, it has been widely
recognized that it is intolerable to require a firm to break a law in order to test
the law's constitutionality. In many circumstances a declaratory judgment
action is the way to avoid the difficulty, but the case law with respect to takings
is emphatic on the point that these anticipatory challenges to state regulations
are not allowed. Administrative remedies, no matter how cumbersome and
slow, must be exhausted before the administrative relief will be provided, for
there are no facial challenges to comprehensive regulatory schemes. 3 5 Here
the form of relief does nothing to ease the sting. So long as the previous
regime continues in place until thejudgment is obtained, there is an increased
loss from having to operate under the impermissible scheme. The exit right
exerts its greatest effects on local governments where a firm is allowed to pick
up stakes and leave at will, without having to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of local regulations to the state that promulgated them or
to a court that never has had to live under their yoke.
The case for having that categorical exit right is very strong once it is
recalled that no firm has ever exploited its consumers by seeking to go out of
business. By exiting, a firm is announcing that it regards the regulated rate of
return as negative. More concretely, the firm views its losses under regulation
as greater than its losses through leaving, which are equal to its losses on
existing assets plus the loss of any future business opportunities within the
32. See, for example, Cal Ins Code § 1861.03(c) (West 1972 & Supp 1991) (requiring renewal
except for nonpayment of premium or substantial increase in insurable risk).
33. See the California decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v Gillespie, 50 Cal3d 82, 266 Cal Rptr
117, 785 P2d 500 (1990), which, in its interpretation of California Proposition 103, held that
Travelers was entitled to exit the state so long as it found a successor corporation that was prepared
to assume its liabilities for renewal for a single year. The decision did not pass on the question
whether the perpetual obligation to renew could be imposed.
34. 209 US 123, 147-48 (1908).
35. See, for example, Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 US 264, 297
(1981); State Farm Insurance Co. v State of New Jersey, 124 NJ 32, 590 A2d 191 (1991) (sustaining NJ Stat
Ann § 17:33 B-51 against a facial constitutional challenge).
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state. No firm will easily make the decision to exit if it is in fact making a
decent return on its invested capital.
The game here thus differs fundamentally from that which is played where
a firm under regulation challenges its rate structure but still is willing to
provide the necessary service. In that case, it is quite possible that the firm is
seeking nothing more than a disguised monopoly rent. So long as the firm is
prepared to stay in the state, that possibility cannot be ruled out in principle.
It is of course possible that the firm's claim of confiscation is valid, but at a
limited level where it is more prudent to stay and fight than it is to leave. But
the relevant judgment that the regulation is oppressive is far easier to make
whenever the firm is prepared to vote with its feet, for now there is no
scenario that allows it to make a profit under regulation. As that is the case,
the categorical prohibition against exit taxes is an effective way to prevent the
abuses that now abound in state regulatory processes.
B.

Exit Rights and Existing Liabilities

There is still one further complication, however. Suppose that the firm has
decided to exit the state because it is worried about the firm's liabilities under
existing contracts, and wishes to leave to avoid paying those liabilities when
they come due. That problem always exists, for example, under insurance
contracts where the obligation of the insured to pay premiums is incurred by
the insured before the insurance company comes under its obligation to pay
out losses. Indeed the early systems of regulation were justified, and rightly
justified, to make sure that companies did not engage in strategic behavior to
avoid their contractual liabilities. To guard against this prospect, insurers are
required to establish reserves for their anticipated losses, and should not be
able to defeat the reserve requirements by exercising any constitutionally
protected exit option.
But those reserve requirements only clarify that the state could require the
firm to remain within the state in order to answer claims on existing contracts.
Perhaps the firm might be required to place some money on deposit within
the state so that in-state plaintiffs are not required to bring suit in a foreign
jurisdiction to vindicate a contract right established within the state. The
obligations here are hardly novel. They are not different from those that are
imposed when any other company wants to liquidate before its contract
obligations are discharged. But if the question is whether the firm must
continue to write new contracts at a loss, then there is no risk of taking money
today and not paying out tomorrow. The basic thenfe still remains
compelling. The exit option should be preserved against that form of
taxation. No firm that has achieved a just rate of return will choose to leave.
Federalism and exit rights under it therefore form an essential backstop
against state exploitation, one that becomes ever more important as the direct
protections against confiscation through regulation become weaker. It is
probably a sign of the times, at least on the American side, that the toleration
of exit taxes becomes greater as the concern over confiscation diminishes.
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Indeed one way to understand this problem is to recognize that any state
claim to impose an exit tax (or even a requirement to keep the firm doing
business within the state) will rest as ever on the operation of the police
power, which is here said to be sufficient to allow the state to take steps to
maintain an orderly market when the withdrawal is threatened.3 6 This claim
would have a certain sense if it were assumed that the breakdown in the
market were attributable to sudden and unforeseen events that are beyond the
power of the state to prevent-war and famine come most quickly to mind.
But the breakdown in the market is a direct function of the system of
regulation that chokes off profitability and innovation in competitive markets.
To have the state first create the crisis with a set of stringent regulations and
then use that crisis to justify still more extensive state regulation is an open
invitation for government irresponsibility. The restrictions on profits, and the
obligations to fund an assigned risk pool, induce existing firms to reduce their
market share and operate as a storm signal that induces other firms to stay out
of the market. The capacity shortage in the automobile insurance industry is
related directly to the limitations on price.
VI
CONCLUSION

The great advantage of the exit remedy is its self-help nature, which may
make it preferable to legal remedies (such as a regulatory decision to grant an
appropriate rate increase) that in principle may offer more substantial relief,
but which also cost more to achieve. To say that federalism remedies may be
cut off by a state whenever there is no clear declaration of a substantive
government wrong is to carry over the relaxed views on individual property
rights to another arena and to compound a major problem. Exit rights are to
federalism as the right to reject defective goods is to the law of sales. Neither
remedy places the injured party in the place he would have enjoyed if a fully
adequate set of remedies had been provided. The buyer armed only with the
right of rejection cannot recover her lost profits on a contract of sale.3 7 The

individual armed only with the right to leave the state cannot get a just rate of
return on the investment in the state. Thus both self-help and legal remedies
are worthy of enforcement in both the private and the public context. Our
courts, both state and federal, should not allow the state or provincial
governments to fritter away these important protections of individual
property rights.

36. See, for example, Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990, § 72, 1990 NJ Sess Law
Serv 8 (West), codified at NJ Stat Ann § 17:33 B-30.
37. See, for example, UCC § 2-711 (Am L Inst, 1990).

